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Last year, Ben Bernanke published a blockbuster paper whose importance to 
the emerging field of law and macroeconomics would be hard to overstate. Titled 
The Real Effects of Disrupted Credit: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis,1 
the paper gets to a vital threshold question for financial stability policy: through 
what channel or channels do financial crises crush the real economy? Bernanke
pits what he calls the “household leverage” narrative of the Great Recession of 
2007 to 2009 against what he calls the “financial fragility” narrative. His empirical 
analysis comes down firmly on the side of the latter narrative.
In this Article, I use Bernanke’s blockbuster as a springboard to make several 
points that are germane to law and macroeconomics as a field of study. First,
understanding acute macroeconomic disasters should be central to this field. It
has been said that the Great Depression gave birth to macroeconomics.2 Law and 
macroeconomics is likewise the product of a macroeconomic catastrophe: the 
Great Recession. Sharp contractions in output and employment are a source of 
incalculable human costs and are politically destabilizing.3 Better understanding 
their causes and cures remains as urgent as ever.
Second, Bernanke’s paper is a great example of what lawyers and legal 
scholars can learn from macroeconomists. If the legal and regulatory system is to 
respond effectively to macroeconomic calamities, it must be attuned to their 
inner workings. My focus here will be on using the legal and regulatory system to 
prevent acute macro disasters from happening in the first place rather than on 
using regulatory levers to apply macroeconomic stimulus once a crisis has already
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1. Ben S. Bernanke, The Real Effects of Disrupted Credit: Evidence from the Global Financial 
Crisis, 49 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 251 (2018). 
2. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Macroeconomic Priorities, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2003) (“Macroeconomics 
was born as a distinct field in the 1940s, as a part of the intellectual response to the Great Depression.”). 
3. See Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick & Christoph Trebesch, Going to Extremes: Politics after 
Financial Crises, 1870–2014, 88 EUR. ECON. REV. 227 (2016) (studying the political fallout from systemic 
financial crises over 140 years). 
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66 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:65 
hit. It seems to me that both of these topics belong within law and 
macroeconomics.4 
There can be no question that some legal and regulatory frameworks are
better than others when it comes to preventing macroeconomic disasters. Gary
Gorton has noted that the U.S. financial system and economy enjoyed a long 
Quiet Period from the early 1930s until 2007.5 This period was not free from
financial crises in a generic sense; the bank and thrift debacle of the 1980s led to
the failures of over 2,600 U.S. depository institutions holding over $700 billion in 
combined assets.6 Bernanke’s own famous early-career research on the Great 
Depression might have led one to expect the 1980s debacle to trigger a severe 
macroeconomic slump. He had posited that widespread bank failures destroy 
established information-rich credit relationships that can’t be quickly replaced by
alternative credit channels, leading to lower overall spending.7 Yet the bank and 
thrift debacle of the 1980s was followed by only a mild, garden-variety recession.
Why was that crisis so benign, macroeconomically speaking? In my view, legal 
scholars have remained too agnostic on these matters—though there are 
exceptions. Different theories about how financial crises produce macro disasters 
point to very different lines of legal and regulatory analysis. Lawyers can learn a 
great deal from macroeconomists on these questions. I explore these issues in
Part II. 
Part III flips the script and asks what macroeconomists can learn from legal
experts when it comes to preventing sharp macroeconomic contractions arising
from the financial sector. Obviously, lawyers can help nonlawyers think about 
legal and regulatory design. But I want to say something more than this banal 
observation. I argue that legal experts might help macroeconomists think about 
the problem of acute macro disasters more from the standpoint of legal-
institutional engineering. Bernanke’s paper adds to a large and convincing body
of literature identifying systemic runs or “panics”—widespread redemptions of 
the financial sector’s very short-term or demandable debt—as a crucial cause or 
amplifier of acute macroeconomic contractions. Here is where legal thinkers can
come in. Anglo-American banking law has almost always sought to confine this 
distinctive funding model to one or more specially chartered “banks.” In other 
words, banking law has always attempted—with varying degrees of success over 
time—to restrict entry into money augmentation.8 This is a structural rule. It’s 
4. Listokin focuses on the stimulus question. See generally YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND 
MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS (2019). 
5. GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 11 (2010). 
6. Bank failure data are from George Hanc, The Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s: 
Summary and Implications, in 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 3, 14–15 (1997). 
Thrift failure data are from Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: 
Truth and Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV. 26, 27 (2000). 
7. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great 
Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257 (1983). 
8. See generally Morgan Ricks, Entry Restriction, Shadow Banking, and the Structure of Monetary 
Institutions, 2 J. FIN. REG. 291 (2016). 
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 67No. 1 2020] MONEY, PRIVATE LAW, AND MACROECONOMIC DISASTERS
what stands in the way of the anarchy of free banking, as I describe below. And 
this feature of banking law necessarily involves interfering with private law—the
background rights and duties of individuals and private entities in relation to one 
another. I have argued elsewhere that modernizing this longstanding structural 
legal tool is a prerequisite to effective macro disaster-prevention.9 Legal experts, 
I submit, can help macroeconomists and others expand their vision to this 
possibility because they are accustomed to crafting legal systems that override
the background rules of private law. To take one example, bankruptcy law rests 
on abrogating creditors’ existing private-law entitlements. The basic point is that
the funding model in question need not be taken as an immutable given; it can be
structurally confined to a dedicated institutional apparatus. Legal experts might 
be able to see this more clearly than others. 
Part IV concludes with some final thoughts on monetary system design.
Money is central to macroeconomics, so it stands to reason that the law of money
should be central to law and macroeconomics.
II
SYSTEMIC RUNS AND MACRO DISASTERS (WHAT LAW CAN LEARN FROM
MACRO)
Bernanke’s blockbuster paper focuses on the Great Recession in the United 
States. He describes two main contending narratives.10 One of them is the  
household leverage narrative, which focuses on the buildup of household debt 
during the real estate boom of the early 2000s.11 When the real estate boom went
bust, household wealth took a hit, leading to declines in consumer spending and 
9. See MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 230–37 
(2016) (discussing entry restriction into money augmentation). 
10. Some experts subscribe to neither narrative. Economists of a neoclassical persuasion have
doubted that financial factors had much if anything to do with the Great Recession. For example, in late 
2008 several neoclassical economists, harshly critical of the government’s financial stabilization program 
then underway, wrote that “[i]t is difficult to see how disruptions in financial markets will directly affect 
investment decisions by a typical firm.” V.V. Chari, Lawrence Christiano & Patrick J. Kehoe, Facts and 
Myths about the Financial Crisis of 2008 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Working Paper No. 666,
2008). A few months later, as output was plummeting, Nobel Prize winner Edward Prescott suggested 
that governmental intervention was to blame: “I think the financial crisis has been greatly overstated as 
a problem. [It has] had virtually no consequences for the real economy . . . . With benign neglect the 
economy would have come roaring back quite quickly.” Interview by Tom Keene, Bloomberg, with 
Edward C. Prescott (Mar. 30, 2009), quoted in Brad DeLong, Do Chicago Economics Nobel-Prize
Winners Live in the Consensus Reality?, BRAD DELONG’S GRASPING REALITY (Sept. 27, 2009),
https://www.bradford-delong.com/2009/09/do-chicago-economics-nobel-prize-winners-live-in-the-
consensus-reality.html [https://perma.cc/6RMG-EHU2]. See also CASEY MULLIGAN, THE 
REDISTRIBUTION RECESSION: HOW LABOR MARKET DISTORTIONS CONTRACTED THE ECONOMY
(2012) (arguing that redistributive public policy was the main culprit behind the Great Recession); Lee
Ohanian, The Economic Crisis from a Neoclassical Perspective, 24 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 4, Fall 2010, at 
45, 55–61 (questioning whether financial factors played much of a role in either the Great Recession or 
the Great Depression). 
11. Bernanke, supra note 2, at 254. 





























   
  




68 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:65 
lower aggregate demand.12 In this narrative, the residential real estate boom and 
bust coupled with high household debt loads were the proximate causes of the 
macroeconomic contraction known as the Great Recession.13 
The other narrative is what Bernanke calls the financial fragility narrative.14 
This narrative focuses on the systemic run or panic in wholesale funding markets,
and resulting fire sales of financial assets, in the 2007 to 2009 period.15 Unlike the 
household leverage narrative, it focuses on the financial crisis proper.16 Runs and
fire sales choked off the supply of new external financing throughout the
economy, leading to a sharp contraction in output.17 
Bernanke acknowledges that the two narratives are not mutually exclusive.
And they overlap to some degree; events in the real estate and mortgage markets 
clearly triggered the systemic run.18 Still, they are distinct stories. The household
leverage narrative omits the financial crisis proper as a driver of the 
macroeconomic contraction. It is a story about decreased consumer spending due 
to a wealth effect. It implies that the macroeconomic contraction would have 
been just as bad, or nearly so, even if the systemic run had somehow been
avoided.19 The financial fragility narrative is very different. It’s about a disruption
in the supply of external financing occasioned by the systemic run. Lack of
financing torpedoed the economy. This is not a story about wealth effects. 
Rather, the financial fragility narrative posits that the systemic run itself was a 
crucial driver of the contraction; had the systemic run somehow been avoided,
the recession would have been far milder. 
Bernanke contends that the financial fragility narrative explains the Great
Recession much better than does the household leverage narrative.20 His
argument is basically about timing. He compares the ability of balance sheet 
factors (such as ABX indexes, real estate investment trust stock prices, bank
credit default swap spreads) versus panic factors (such as London Interbank 
Offered Rate-Overnight Indexed Swap spreads, asset-backed commercial paper 
12. Id.





 18. Id. at 254–55.  
19. See Dean Baker, Opinion, Blame It On the Bubble, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 8, 2010), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/mar/08/financial-crisis-subprimecrisis 
[https://perma.cc/E6JK-PGRA] (stating that losses of housing wealth caused the slump; the financial 
crisis and rescue were “all sideshow”); Dean Baker, What Krugman Said, with a Not So Small Addendum, 
CTR. ECON. POL’Y RES.: BEAT THE PRESS (Oct. 20, 2012), http://cepr.net/blogs/beat-the-press/what-
krugman-said-with-a-not-so-small-addendum [https://perma.cc/NF77-PK22] (“We would be in pretty
much the same place today even if the financial crisis had not happened.”). Cf. PETER TEMIN, DID
MONETARY FORCES CAUSE THE GREAT DEPRESSION 9–10, 11, 83 (1976) (stating that the banking 
panics were results of the Depression rather than causes, and that “[h]ad [the banking panics] not taken
place . . . the overall story of the Depression would not have been much different”). 
20. Bernanke, supra note 1, at 255. 
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 69No. 1 2020] MONEY, PRIVATE LAW, AND MACROECONOMIC DISASTERS
(ABCP) spreads, corporate bond spreads) to forecast monthly macroeconomic 
indicators over the period 2006 to 2012. Bernanke writes: 
I find that factors most strongly associated with the financial panic—the run on short-
term funding and the panic in securitization markets—are also by far the best predictors
of adverse economic changes in a range of [monthly] macroeconomic indicators, and 
that ending the panic is likewise associated with relative economic improvement. The
macroeconomic forecasting ability of factors associated with housing and mortgage
quality is much more modest.21 
In other words, the systemic run was what made the Great Recession great: 
“The finding of the centrality of the panic helps to explain why the recession,
which looked moderate in its early stages, became so deep.”22 
Bernanke devotes a portion of the paper to describing the mechanism by 
which he thinks systemic runs affect the real economy. Runs on the financial
sector’s short-term debt require financial institutions to dump financial assets in
fire sales.23 The market becomes saturated with these assets, whose prices become
depressed. The important thing to understand is that these fire sales lead to 
reduced supply, and spiking cost, of new credit. Elevated yields on secondary 
market assets become the hurdle rate for newly-originated financing in the 
primary credit markets. New credit becomes very hard to get for consumers and 
businesses alike. In a separate blog post about the paper, Bernanke calls this a 
“panic-induced credit crunch.”24 The dearth of new credit causes a contraction in
overall economic activity: for a time, individuals and businesses can’t get new
financing for consumption or investment. Other economists have sketched 
versions of this causal mechanism before.25 
Pioneering empirical studies by Atif Mian and Amir Sufi lend support to the 
other narrative, the household leverage narrative. “The dramatic loss in wealth
of indebted home owners is the key driver of severe recessions,” they write.26 
With respect to the Great Recession, the heart of their case rests on a zip code-
level analysis of household leverage, spending, and employment.27 They find that 
in 2008 and 2009, spending fell more in counties with larger declines in housing 
21. Id.
 22. Id. at 295. 
23. See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 60–61 
(1873) (“According to the saying, you ‘can sell Consols on a Sunday.’ . . . But not so in a general panic 
. . . . All ordinary bankers are wanting to sell, or thinking they may have to sell.”). 
24. Ben S. Bernanke, How important was the financial panic as a cause of the Great Recession?, AM.
ECON. ASS’N (2018), https://www.aeaweb.org/forum/400/how-important-was-the-financial-panic-cause-
great-recession [https://perma.cc/X9WT-YJG8]. I used the term “panic-induced financing crunch” in my 
own work describing this mechanism. See RICKS, supra note 9, at 111. 
25. The elements of this theory appear in Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance
and Macroeconomics, 25 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 1, Winter 2011, at 29, 29–35; Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary 
Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 57, 57–61 (2012). This mechanism is quite 
different from the purely monetary mechanism described in Friedman and Schwartz as well as from the 
mechanism Bernanke outlined in his famous 1983 paper. See generally Bernanke, supra note 7. 
26. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT 
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 133 (2014).  
27. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, What Explains the 2007–2009 Drop in Employment?, 82 
ECONOMETRICA 2197, 2199–2200 (2014). 
















    
   
 
  
   
       
  
 
   
 
       
  
      
  
70 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:65 
net worth than in counties with smaller declines.28 Further, the decline in jobs
catering to local demand was larger in counties with larger declines in housing 
net worth; by contrast, the decline in jobs catering to national demand was spread
evenly across counties.29 
It remains an open question, however, just how responsible the housing net 
worth channel was for the decline in aggregate employment in the Great 
Recession.30 Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist, prefiguring Bernanke’s paper to
some degree, note that the common slowdown in nonconstruction employment 
growth across regions in late 2007, as well as the dramatic acceleration in 
employment decline across regions right when Lehman failed, are not easily
explained by the pattern of house price declines but match up very well with
broad indicators of financial distress.31 The authors then use both cross-sectional 
and time series analyses to “disentangle the relative contributions” of the 
household balance sheet channel and the financial disruption channel to the 
decline in employment in the Great Recession.32 They conclude that the financial 
disruption channel had a significantly larger impact and that “the recession would
have been far milder in the absence of the financial turmoil.”33 
Although he doesn’t mention it in his paper, Bernanke’s argument about the
singular importance of the systemic run or panic in driving the macroeconomic 
downturn of 2007 to 2009 links up with a longstanding theme in macroeconomic 
scholarship. Walter Bagehot wrote in 1873 that panics pose a “great danger” to 
the “industrial system.”34 He distinguished panics from speculative booms and
busts in asset prices (the “inevitable vicissitudes of the market”) which he viewed 
as more benign.35 Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz sounded a similar note in 
their seminal study of nearly a century of U.S. monetary history. “Banking 
panics,” they concluded, “have occurred only during severe contractions and 
have greatly intensified such contractions, if indeed they have not been the
primary factor converting what would otherwise have been mild contractions into 
severe ones.”36 Schwartz later said systemic runs or panics are what distinguish
“real” from “pseudo” financial crises.37 In her typology, the collapse of a debt-
fueled bubble, standing alone, would fall in the pseudo category. Gary Gorton
similarly equated financial crises with panics, or situations in which “holders of 
28. Atif Mian, Kamalesh Rao & Amir Sufi, Household Balance Sheets, Consumption, and the
Economic Slump, 128 Q.J. ECON. 1687, 1690 (2013).  
29.  Mian & Sufi, supra note 27, at 2216–19. 
30.  Mian and Sufi don’t supply an estimate in the paper. See Mian & Sufi, supra note 28. 
31. Mark Gertler & Simon Gilchrist, What Happened: Financial Factors in the Great Recession, 32
J. ECON. PERSP., no. 3, Summer 2018, at 3, 26. I made a similar note in RICKS, supra note 9, at 102. 
32. Gertler & Gilchrist, supra note 31, at 20.  
33. Id. at 26. 
34. BAGEHOT, supra note 23, at 17. 
35. Id. at 158–59. 
36. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA J. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1867–1960, 463 (1963). 
37. Anna J. Schwartz, Real and Pseudo Financial Crises, in MONEY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
271, 283 (Anna J. Schwartz ed., 1987). 
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 71No. 1 2020] MONEY, PRIVATE LAW, AND MACROECONOMIC DISASTERS
short-term liabilities . . . [refuse] to fund ‘banks.’”38 He was critical of more
generic concepts of financial crisis or “systemic event,” which he viewed as too 
vague.39 He suggested that the absence of panics in the United States from 1934 
until 2007 largely explains the absence of true macroeconomic disasters in that 
period.40 
In a painstaking empirical study, Andrew Jalil analyzed U.S. banking
panics—“run[s] to convert deposits into currency”—prior to the Great
Depression and found that major banking panics had large, rapid, and highly
persistent negative effects on output.41 Jalil estimated that output declines by
roughly ten percent in the year following a major banking panic.42 Systemic runs,
he concluded, have been “a primary source of business-cycle fluctuations 
throughout US history.”43 
The role of banking panics in propagating the Great Depression remains a 
subject of debate. Friedman and Schwartz argued that the banking panics of the
early 1930s bore primary responsibility for the Great Depression in the United
States. Subsequent research on the Depression has stressed the causal role of the 
international gold standard, but these two explanations are complementary,44 and 
they both implicate monetary system design. Bernanke in 2002 described 
Friedman and Schwartz’s achievement as “nothing less than to provide what has
become the leading and most persuasive explanation of the worst economic 
disaster in American history.”45 Banking panics may also bear substantial 
responsibility for the Great Depression in other countries. Recent research
suggests that banking panics in France in 1930 and 1931 led to a massive credit 
crunch and were major drivers of its Great Depression.46 The close association 
between systemic runs or panics and acute macroeconomic disasters can also be 
seen in the experience of Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s. Both countries 
experienced systemic runs on their financial sectors, which had become heavily 
reliant on money-market, short-term, debt.47 The systemic run on these firms was 
a proto-shadow banking panic. The Swedish run involved “marknadsbevis,” 
38. GORTON, supra note 5, at 62. 
39. Id. at 15. 
40. See id. at 2.
41.  Andrew J. Jalil, A New History of Banking Panics in the United States, 1825–1929: Construction 
and Implications, 7 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 295, 328 (2015). 
42. Id.
 43. Id.
 44. See  BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION, 1919–1939, 18 (1992).  
45. Ben S. Bernanke, Remarks On Milton Friedman’s Ninetieth Birthday at the Conference to
Honor Milton Friedman (Nov. 8, 2002), https://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/
2002/20021108/ [https://perma.cc/MSK4-4ZCB]. 
46. Patrice Baubeau, Eric Monnet, Angelo Riva & Stefano Ungaro, Flight-to-Safety and the Credit 
Crunch: A New History of the Banking Crisis in France During the Great Depression 2–5 (Banque de
France, Working Paper No. 698, 2018). 
47. Peter Englund & Vesa Vihriala, Financial Crisis in Finland and Sweden: Similar But Not Quite 
the Same, in THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN: THE NORDIC EXPERIENCE OF
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 77, 87 (Lars Jonung, Jaakko Kiander & Pentti Vartia eds., 2009). 






















      
   
   
   
      
 
       
    
   
 
     
    
   
  




72 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:65 
essentially ABCP.48 A credit crunch ensued—apparently another example of a
panic-induced credit crunch.49 Both countries’ economies promptly tanked, with
falling real income and soaring unemployment. The non-employment rate rose
by ten percentage points in Sweden and fifteen percentage points in Finland.50 
I have argued before that Japan’s experience in the 1990s may provide yet 
another powerful, and somewhat neglected, example of a panic-induced credit 
crunch slamming the real economy.51 Japan’s economic slump starting in the
1990s is typically seen through a balance sheet lens: a collapsed asset-price bubble
coupled with high debt loads led to lower spending.52 However, while Japan’s 
massive bubble in stocks and real estate burst in 1990, the economy didn’t fare
too badly in its aftermath. As Adam Posen has noted, Japan’s problems in the
early part of the 1990s were “far milder than is commonly recognized.”53 It was
not until late 1997 that Japan’s economy took an abrupt turn for the worse. A 
confluence of events likely precipitated the 1997 downturn. A number of analysts 
have pointed to contractionary fiscal policy, which no doubt played a role.54 But 
the broader Asian financial crisis—which was orthogonal to Japan’s debt-fueled 
bubble—also hit Japan at that time, and it precipitated a severe shadow banking 
panic.55 When a small securities firm failed in late 1997, it was “the first default 
ever in Japan’s money market” and led to a systemic run that “radically reduced 
the provision of credit to market participants and shrank liquidity throughout the 
financial system.”56 The default “paralysed the entire interbank market” and in 
short order “it was as though the financial system was starting to melt down.”57 
48. See id. at 90 (“This was a sort of ‘run’; rather than actively running to the bank to withdraw 
deposits the holders of maturing marknadsbevis, otherwise routinely reinvesting, now refused renewed
funding in the face of an imminent bankruptcy risk. The crisis spread to the whole market for
marknadsbevis, which dried up in a couple of days . . . . The crisis also spread to other segments of the 
money market with sharply increasing spreads between t-bills and certificates of deposit.”). See also
Stefan Ingves & Göran Lind, Stockholm Solutions, 45 FIN. & DEV. 21, 22 (2008) (“In the Swedish crisis, 
finance companies played a role similar to that of [Structured Investment Vehicles].”). 
49.  Englund & Vihriala, supra note 47, at 112. 
50. Klas Fregert & Jaakko Pehkonen, The Crisis of the 1990s and Unemployment in Finland and
Sweden, in THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS IN FINLAND AND SWEDEN: THE NORDIC EXPERIENCE OF
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION, 133 (Lars Jonung, Jaakko Kiander & Pentti Vartia eds., 2009). 
51. See RICKS, supra note 9, at 133–35. 
52. See generally  RICHARD C. KOO, BALANCE SHEET RECESSION: JAPAN’S STRUGGLE WITH
UNCHARTED ECONOMICS AND ITS GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS (2003). 
53. Adam Posen, It Takes More Than a Bubble to Become Japan, in  ASSET PRICES AND
MONETARY POLICY 203, 205 (Anthony Richards & Tim Robinson eds., 2003). Cf. Tamim Bayoumi, The 
Morning After: Explaining the Slowdown in Japanese Growth in the 1990s, 53 J. INT’L ECON. 241, 242
(2001) (“[I]n 1997 the economy entered into its first recession since the early 1970s.”). 
54. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 72
(2009); RICHARD C. KOO, THE HOLY GRAIL OF MACROECONOMICS 152 (2011). 
55. Hiroshi Nakaso, The Financial Crisis in Japan during the 1990s: How the Bank of Japan
Responded and the Lessons Learnt, 6 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS PAPERS 1, 9, 11 (2001). 
56. Yasuyuki Fuchita & Kei Kodachi, Managing Systemwide Financial Crises: Some Lessons from
Japan since 1990, in ROCKY TIMES: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON FINANCIAL STABILITY 11, 28, 29 (Yasuyuki 
Fuchita, Richard Herring & Robert Litan eds., 2012). 
57. Nakaso, supra note 55, at 11.  
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 73No. 1 2020] MONEY, PRIVATE LAW, AND MACROECONOMIC DISASTERS
Financial sector short-term funding spreads spiked sharply, as did corporate bond 
spreads.58 This was no minor event; Romer and Romer recently constructed a
new series on financial distress in twenty-four Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development countries for the 1967 to 2007 period and found that 
Japan’s 1997 to 1999 experience was by far the worst episode of financial 
distress—and the only extreme crisis—in their entire sample before 2007.59 True 
to form, Japan’s shadow banking panic set off a severe credit crunch, and
macroeconomic contraction immediately followed. Quite possibly, Japan’s 
experience in the 1990s was as much a panic story as a balance sheet story! 
Some analysts have doubted that systemic runs or panics, which are brief 
events, can explain protracted macroeconomic slumps.60 But why shouldn’t we
expect severe negative shocks to have long-lasting or even permanent effects on 
the economy? When the economy gets pushed into a deep enough ditch, it may 
have trouble climbing out, and monetary and fiscal stimulus may not offer an easy 
escape. There is no assurance that the economy will return to its previous
trendline when the panic subsides. James Tobin followed John Maynard Keynes 
in questioning “the efficacy of the economy’s natural market adjustment 
mechanisms in restoring full employment equilibrium, once a negative real
demand shock had pushed the economy off that equilibrium.”61 Tobin conceived 
of the problem as a kind of economy-wide coordination failure: output is
constrained by demand for goods and services; demand for goods and services is 
constrained by employment; and employment is constrained by output.62 So an
economy can get stuck on a lower trajectory after a big negative shock.63 
58. Masazumi Hattori, Koji Koyama & Tatsuya Yonetani, Analysis of Credit Spread in Japan’s 
Corporate Bond Market, 5 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS PAPERS 113 (2001). 
59. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, New Evidence on the Aftermath of Financial Crises in 
Advanced Countries, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 3072, 3080 (2017). 
60. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Steeper Versus Deeper (Wonkish), N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/opinion/steeper-versus-deeper-wonkish.html [https://per/ 
ma.cc/5274-699D] (“How much did the financial crisis contribute to these extremely high levels of 
economic slack, long after the disruption had ended? I still don’t see how to make it the main story.”); 
Paul Krugman, Opinion, Botching the Great Recession, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.ny/
times.com/2018/09/12/opinion/botching-the-great-recession.html [https://perma.cc/NF5Y-FSUW] (“Why
didn’t financial stability bring a rapid bounceback? Because financial disruption wasn’t at the heart of
the slump. The really big factor was the bursting of the housing bubble—of which the banking crisis was
a symptom.”). 
61. James Tobin, Price Flexibility and Output Stability: An Old Keynesian View, 7 J. ECON. PERSP.,
no. 1, Winter 1993, at 45, 47–48. See also JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 27 (1936) (“The economic system may find itself in stable 
equilibrium with [employment] at a level below full employment.”); John Maynard Keynes, A Self-
Adjusting Economic System?, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 20, 1935) (doubting that the economic system has
any “inherent tendency towards self-adjustment”). 
62. Tobin, supra note 61, at 47, 50.
 63. Cf. ROGER E. A. FARMER, HOW THE ECONOMY WORKS: CONFIDENCE, CRASHES AND SELF-
FULFILLING PROPHECIES (2010); Russell Cooper & Andrew John, Coordinating Coordination Failures
in Keynesian Models, 103 Q.J. ECON. 441, 442 (1988) (describing models that exhibit “underemployment 
equilibria” owing to “the inability of agents to coordinate their actions successfully in a many-person,
decentralized economy” rather than to “the usual Keynesian assumptions” of wage or price rigidities);
Peter A. Diamond, Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium, 90 J. POL. ECON. 881, 886 
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This is not to say that high household debt loads might not be an obstacle to
recovery after a deep contraction, just that there are other possible obstacles: 
intrinsic features of the economic system may hinder a return to full employment, 
even with the aid of stimulative public policy. In that case, preventing severe 
negative shocks in the first place becomes even more important. As noted above, 
Andrew Jalil’s research on nineteenth century U.S. banking panics shows that
severe panics invariably set off prolonged slumps.64 In some cases, trend output 
growth was slower after the panic-induced recession than before, suggesting
permanent damage.65 Given the primitive state of consumer credit markets in 
that era, it seems unlikely that household debt loads were to blame. 
The propensity of financial crises to produce macroeconomic calamities is the
main reason we care about financial crises in the first place. And if preventing
macroeconomic disasters is the raison d’etre for financial stability regulation, 
understanding the transmission channels that are the focus of Bernanke’s
blockbuster paper is paramount. This means deconstructing crises into their 
component parts and asking where most of the damage comes from. Too often, 
analysts lump various phenomena into a broad and generic conception of 
financial crisis. The financial crisis, taken as a whole, then becomes the unit of 
analysis and the thing to be prevented. This inevitably draws attention away from
the systemic run or panic and toward the various excesses that preceded it. I think
legal analysts are especially prone to this error. Bernanke—like Bagehot, 
Friedman and Schwartz, Gorton, and others—instead asks us to disaggregate, to 
treat the panic itself as a distinct event. 
One final point on what legal professionals and scholars can learn from 
macroeconomists: we can learn to think more clearly about what types of 
instruments or claims function as money—and what it means for something to 
function as money. Assets that are readily used for payments are obviously 
money, but many macroeconomists have favored a somewhat broader definition.
Friedman and Schwartz declined to limit their conception of money based on 
what they called “a priori considerations,” such as use in payments.66 Instead they 
saw varying degrees of what they called “moneyness” in different assets.67 John
Hicks said the same thing a quarter century earlier: “Bills of short maturity . . . 
[are] not quite perfect money, but still very close substitutes for it,” he wrote.68 
“The rate of interest on these securities is a measure . . . of their imperfect 
‘moneyness.’”69 Henry Simons opined that “short-term debts . . . are . . . closely
(1982) (“[T]he presence of multiple steady-state equilibria implies that the economy can get stuck at the 
‘wrong’ steady-state equilibrium after the shock has gone away.”). 
64. See Jalil, supra note 41, at 328 (finding that panics had large effects on output and that panic-
induced downturns “differed substantially” from other downturns). 
65. Id. at 326–27. 
66. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, MONETARY STATISTICS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: ESTIMATES, SOURCES, METHODS, 104 (1970). 
67. Id. at 111.  
68. JOHN HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL 163 (2d ed. 1946). 
69. Id.
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akin to money and demand deposits.”70 And Keynes suggested we “treat as 
money” debt instruments with a maturity not “in excess of three months.”71 
More recently, a number of top economists and other experts have 
emphasized that the financial sector’s short-term debt has a distinctly monetary 
character. Gary Gorton refers to various types of financial sector short-term debt
as “forms of money” and “private money.”72 Jeremy Stein says that the financial 
sector’s short-term debt obligations are “private money” and offer “monetary
services” and that they have “money-ness.”73 John Cochrane says “short-term 
debt is money.”74 In a 2016 speech, the Federal Reserve’s Daniel Tarullo 
observed that such short-term debt instruments exhibit “features sometimes 
characterized as ‘money-like.’”75 Their “private creation,” he said, “is, at least to
some degree, the creation of money outside of the operations of central banks or 
of depository institutions subject to reserve requirements and other 
regulations.”76 
Is this stuff really money?77 In one sense the debate is semantic, but the 
conceptual stakes are still high. I recently learned that matter can occupy an
intermediate phase between liquid and gas, called a supercritical fluid. It is 
neither liquid nor gas, or both liquid and gas, depending on how you look at it. A 
supercritical fluid has density and solvating properties resembling those of a 
liquid, but its diffusivity and absence of surface tension are characteristic of gases. 
Supercritical fluids can also be tuned to be more liquid-like or more gas-like by 
altering temperature and pressure. Cash equivalents, I submit, are the 
supercritical fluid of financial instruments, sitting between bonds and cash. They 
are not a medium of exchange, but owing to their extremely low credit risk and
extremely low interest-rate risk, they have a very stable value in relation to the 
medium of exchange. In a world where prices are sticky in the short run, this 
70. Henry C. Simons, A Positive Program for Laissez Faire: Some Proposals for a Liberal Economic 
Policy (1934), in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 320 n.7 (1948). 
71. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY 167 n.1 (1936). 
72. GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM 
COMING 5 (2012); Gary B. Gorton & Guillermo Ordoñez, Collateral Crises, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 343, 
344 (2014). 
73. Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 57, 58 (2012). 
74. John H. Cochrane, Toward a Run-Free Financial System, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 197, 224 (Martin Neil Baily & John B. Taylor eds., 2014)
(emphasis in original).
75.  Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Sys., Opening Remarks at the Center for American
Progress and Americans for Financial Reform Conference on Exploring Shadow Banking: Can the
Nation Avoid the Next Crisis? (July 12, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
tarullo20160712a.htm [https://perma.cc/JF9J-S87F]. 
76. Id.
77. Admati and Hellwig have said that the notion that banks “produce (or create) money . . . rests 
on an abuse of the word ‘money.’” Anat R. Admati & Martin F. Hellwig, The Parade of Bankers’ New
Clothes Continues: 23 Flawed Claims Debunked 6 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., 
Working Paper No. 143, 2013).  
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stable-price feature of cash equivalents imparts “moneyness” to them.78 And this 
moneyness is empirically visible at the very short end of the yield curve.79 
Recognizing this, accounting standards classify high quality debt instruments with 
maturities of three months or less as “cash equivalents,”80 and central banks have 
long grouped many of these instruments in their broad measures of the money
stock. 
Cash equivalents are always very simple: they are basically zero-coupon
IOUs, the most primitive financial instruments in existence. Simplicity may 
actually be essential to moneyness. Otherwise these instruments would need to 
be carefully investigated, which would defeat the purpose. Fortunately, this
inherent simplicity may ease the task of institutional engineering, which I discuss 
next.
III
INSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING (WHAT MACRO CAN LEARN FROM LAW)
Bernanke concludes that his analysis provides retrospective justification for 
the U.S. government’s unpopular financial rescue in the 2007 to 2009 period,81 
which he played a big role in executing. He contends, correctly I think, that the 
rescue forestalled an even bigger macroeconomic catastrophe.82 Prospectively, he 
stresses the need to maintain the government’s “firefighting tools” to equip 
future Ben Bernankes to do it again.83 Apart from that, he offers a somewhat 
bland call for “continued vigilance in ensuring financial stability.”84 
This is a missed opportunity—and an area where legal thinkers might be able 
to offer some insights. Suppose it’s true that systemic runs or panics are a major 
source of macroeconomic catastrophes: they are the main danger the financial 
system poses to the broader economy. Suppose also that systemic runs or panics 
are specific to private money—“[f]inancial crises are everywhere and always 
about short-term debt,” Douglas Diamond has said.85 Combining these premises
leads to the conclusion that financial instability is, and always has been, mostly
about private sector money creation. The problem is therefore one of monetary 
system design. This recognition is liberating: it suggests we are dealing with a
discrete task of institutional engineering rather than an open-ended search for 
78.  Or so I have argued. See RICKS, supra note 9, at 4. 
79. Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, A Comparative Advantage Approach
to Government Debt Maturity, 70 J. FIN. 1683, 1688 (2015) (finding a money premium of up to sixty basis
points in short-term Treasury bills). 
80. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY OF STATEMENT NO. 95: STATEMENT OF
CASH FLOWS 6 (1987), https://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum95.shtml [https://perma.cc/4MRD-PU9N].  
81. Bernanke, supra note 1, at 256. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 309. 
84. Id. at 308. 
85. See Douglas W. Diamond, Remarks at the Panel Discussion on Financial Regulation at the 
University of Chicago’s Becker Friedman Institute (Nov. 6, 2010) (explaining that short-term debt or 
“private money” are drivers of financial crises) (comment appears at the eight-minute mark). 
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endless sources of financial instability. In fact maybe the term “financial
instability” is too vague and amorphous to be useful, suggesting as it does 
something beyond the very particular phenomenon of runs on defaultable 
money-claims. 
Here is one way of restating the problem in legal-institutional terms. Given
some established medium of exchange, entrepreneurs can set up money-
augmentation firms that hold reserves of established money and then issue larger 
quantities of IOUs redeemable on demand or in the very near term for that 
existing money. These firms’ asset portfolios typically consist mostly of 
nonmonetary financial assets like loans and bonds. This business model can be 
established using the ordinary background rules of what lawyers call “private 
law”—in this case, property, contract, business organizations, and, in some 
instances, the law of security interests.86 No other legal technologies are required. 
A pivotal threshold question for the state is whether and, if so, under what terms 
and conditions, to allow this business model to exist. 
Anglo-American banking law has consistently answered this question with
entry restriction. That is, it has sought to legally confine the activity of money
augmentation to one or more specially chartered entities called banks, which are
then forced to inhabit a unique institutional environment, operating essentially 
as franchisees of the state.87 Restricting entry in this way necessitates a general 
prohibition—the law must specify what it is that chartered banks are permitted
to do, liability-wise, that is off-limits to everyone else—which has meant 
overriding the background rules of private law mentioned above.
Both conceptually and practically, this requires a legal definition. Just as 
securities law starts by defining “security,”88 investment company law starts by
defining “investment company,”89 and insurance law starts by defining 
“insurance,”90 the law governing money-augmentation firms must start by
defining what exactly a “money” claim is. Congress in the 1860s sought to assert 
federal control over money augmentation by effectively prohibiting “every 
86. See KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND 
INEQUALITY 1–22 (2019) (explaining the various ways capital is “coded” into law). 
87. Cf. MILTON FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 74 (1960) (“[The 
government] has a monopoly on the issuance of money, though it has chosen to give up part of its
monopoly powers by permitting commercial banks to operate with fractional required reserves.”); id. at 
8 (describing commercial banks as “issuers of money”); IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY 44 (3d ed. 1945) 
(“[B]anks are virtually private mints.”); Frank D. Graham, Partial Reserve Money and the 100 Per Cent
Proposal, 26 AM. ECON. REV. 428 (1936). The apt “franchise” descriptor comes from Robert C. Hockett 
& Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2017). They use it much
more broadly to encompass much of the financial sector, however, whereas I confine it to banks’ role in
the monetary framework. I had previously used the phrase “public-private partnership,” see RICKS, supra
note 9, but franchise is much better since it correctly implies hierarchy rather than coequal status. 
88. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1) (2012). 
90. See TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 622 (4th ed. 2017) 
(“Whatever the content of insurance regulation, there is a need to determine the range of economic
activity to which that regulation applies . . . . [T]he definition of the term ‘insurance’ is central to
determining the jurisdiction of state ‘insurance’ departments.”). 



















     
 







    
 
    
   
78 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:65 
person, firm, association . . . [or] corporation” apart from federally chartered 
banks from issuing “their own notes used for circulation.”91 At the time, bank 
notes were viewed as money but deposit accounts generally were not.92 This was 
a consequential oversight: deposit banking flourished and money augmentation 
therefore persisted outside the carefully engineered federal apparatus. Since the 
New Deal, U.S. federal law has said (more or less) that you need a banking 
charter to maintain “deposit” liabilities93—but, amazingly, “deposit” is not 
defined.94 
This formalistic (as opposed to functional) approach has made our entry
restriction law very easy to sidestep. When the money market mutual fund 
(MMF) industry arose in the late 1970s, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) was faced with the question of whether claims on MMFs were “deposits”
and thus whether MMFs were engaged in unauthorized banking. The SEC asked 
the Department of Justice for a legal opinion on the matter. The Department of 
Justice opined in essence that MMF shares are not deposits because they are
equity, not debt—a formalistic and superficial analysis.95 The Department of 
Justice failed to recognize that MMFs arose precisely to create deposit 
substitutes. MMFs of course would later prove just as unstable as uninsured bank
deposits. At the peak of the 2008 financial crisis, prime institutional money funds 
suffered a massive run, prompting the U.S. government’s single largest rescue 
commitment of the crisis—$3 trillion.96 
I have argued elsewhere that it is hard to see how financial stability policy can
be effective without modernizing and fortifying entry restriction into the business 
of money augmentation.97 The alternative is free banking or free entry into 
91. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 469, 484 (as amended by Act of February 8, 1875, ch. 
36, § 19, 18 Stat. 307, 311). 
92. Charles F. Dunbar, Deposits as Currency, 1 Q.J. ECON. 401, 402 (1887) (“The ease with which 
we ignore deposits as a part of the currency seems the more remarkable, when we consider that . . . it is
a circulating medium in as true a sense and in the same sense as the bank-note, and that, like the bank-
note, it is created by the bank and for the same purposes.”). Fast-forward a century and you find smart 
analysts coming to the same realization about nondeposit cash equivalents. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey
& Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 237, 237
(1992). 
93.  12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2) (2012). 
94. “Deposit” is statutorily defined for deposit insurance purposes but not entry restriction 
purposes. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l) (2012) (providing the current statutory definition for a deposit). That 
definition would not help for entry restriction anyway, because it defines deposit as “money or its
equivalent received or held by a bank.” § 1813(l)(1). It would be a legal circle to say that only banks can 
maintain deposit liabilities and to simultaneously define “deposit” as a liability of a bank.
 95. See Letter from Philip B. Heymann & Lawrence Lippe, Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Martin Lybecker, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Mktg. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 1979) (on file 
with author). 
96. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx [https://perma.cc/X3H5-TC95] (summarizing the terms of the federal
guarantee program). 
97. See RICKS, supra note 9, at 230–37; Morgan Ricks, Entry Restriction, Shadow Banking, and the
Structure of Monetary Institutions, 2 J. FIN. REG. 291–95 (2016). 
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money augmentation. This is the system we have today. Cash equivalents have 
no legal status as such under U.S. law. This makes the task of regulation and 
supervision all but impossible; there is no compartmentalization, no structural 
barrier. We have effectively decided that unrestricted private money creation is 
a good thing. “We have regulation about the government having monopoly over
currency, but we allow these very close substitutes, we think it’s good,” Ken
Rogoff said a few years ago. “But maybe . . . it’s not so good.”98 
Banking law cannot serve a useful economic purpose if its application is not 
coextensive with the activity it is designed to deal with. In the last several decades, 
dollar-denominated money augmentation has seeped, on a massive scale, outside
our system of chartered banks.99 Short-term repo and Eurodollar instruments are
the biggest categories, in addition to MMF shares.100 In response, lawmakers have 
taken regulatory and supervisory tools originally developed for banks and
applied them to myriad other types of financial institutions. The implicit 
justification for this expansion has been that banks are not special, that shadow
banks pose the same sorts of problems that banks pose. Fair enough, but the 
specialness of banks is itself a policy choice—and entry restriction is the legal
means through which that choice is made. If banks alone were permitted to
engage in money augmentation, banks would be special!101 And there is more at 
stake here than systemic runs and macroeconomic disasters. The business of 
money augmentation also implicates issues of monetary control as well as the 
prospect of private capture of seigniorage.102 
Legally restricting entry into money augmentation, on a functional basis,
would require overriding the background rules of private law. The funding model 
in question—the use of large quantities of short-term or demandable debt, 
continuously rolled over, to fund portfolios of financial assets—would need to be
legally prohibited outside the chartered banking system. But lawyers should be 
comfortable with this sort of structural rule. All sorts of bedrock legal institutions 
override the standard rules of property and contract. I mentioned one above: 
bankruptcy law vetoes the operation of standard creditor remedies that would 
otherwise be available under commercial law.103 The whole field of bankruptcy
thus rests on abrogating creditors’ background legal entitlements. A less obvious 
example is the law of business organizations; according to one prominent theory, 
the most basic function of organizational law is to override the “background rules 
98. Kenneth Rogoff, Professor of Pub. Policy & Professor of Econ. at Harvard Univ., Remarks at 
the 14th Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference of the International Monetary Fund (Nov. 8, 2013), 
https://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/view.aspx?vid=2821294542001 [https://perma.cc/UT3T-R5F2].  
99. See RICKS, supra note 9, at 232–37. 
100. Id.
101. This entire old debate is thus built on a basic misunderstanding. See Richard C. Aspinwall, On 
the “Specialness” of Banking, 7 ISSUES BANK REG. 16 (1983); E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?,
1982 FED. RESERVE BANK MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP. A much-admired James Tobin essay on the subject
makes the same mistake, in my view. James Tobin, Commercial Banks as Creators of “Money,” in
BANKING AND MONETARY STUDIES 408–19 (Deane Carson ed., 1963). 
102.  Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 777 (2018). 
103.  11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012). 


















   
  
    





80 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:65 
of contract and property law” that would otherwise give business owners’ 
personal creditors a claim on business assets pari passu with business creditors.104 
Another example is the legal attribute of negotiability, which overrules the 
fundamental property law principle nemo dat qui non habet (you cannot transfer
what you don’t have).105 Similarly, the legal principle of common carriage
overrules standard property entitlements by disallowing owners of certain 
resources from charging different prices to similarly-situated users.106 Perhaps it
should not be surprising that the law of money—like other core legal institutions 
of a market economy, such as bankruptcy and antitrust—should be 
fundamentally built on restricting the domain of property and contract 
entitlements. Lawyers should be quite comfortable with imposing these sorts of 
structural limits on the scope of private law. Lawmakers do this all the time. 
Another thing lawmakers do all the time is draw a dividing line along a 
continuum. There is no sharp dividing line between money and bonds, as we have 
seen. But this should not be treated as an obstacle to entry restriction. The basic 
task of entry restriction would be to say that no one apart from chartered banks 
may use the distinctive and identifiable funding model we associate with banking,
a key feature of which is the use of large amounts of short-term or demandable 
debt that is continuously rolled over. What counts as short-term must therefore 
be legally specified. Empirical evidence from the U.S. Treasury security market 
shows that money-ness is highly concentrated at the very short end of the yield
curve, at maturities of six months or less.107 Whether we choose six or nine or 
twelve months probably would not matter very much; that’s the right 
neighborhood. There is no single correct answer, but lawmakers do this kind of 
thing routinely: think voting ages and statutes of limitation. As noted above, 
accounting standards use a three-month maturity cutoff to classify something as 
a cash equivalent. MMF regulations limit average portfolio duration to sixty days 
and specify that MMFs may not own any assets with remaining maturities of 
greater than 397 days.108 There are countless other examples. 
Restricting entry is only the first step of the institutional engineering 
challenge. How should entry rights be allocated? What terms and conditions
should attach? What should substantive regulation of chartered banks, which
would have a monopoly on money augmentation, look like? How, if at all, should
their portfolios be restricted? Should their monetary liabilities, whether or not
styled as “deposits,” be explicitly backed by the state? Should there be a
supervisory apparatus, and what should it look like?109 Is a special insolvency 
104. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE 
L.J. 387, 411 (2000). 
105.  James S. Rogers, Negotiability, Property, and Identity, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 471, 478 (1990). 
106. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 279–95 (1998) (tracing the impact of 
the common carriage doctrine on private contract rights). 
107. See Greenwood, Hanson & Stein, supra note 79, at 1688. 
108.  17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7(d)(1) (2017). 
109. See Lev Menand, The Monetary Basis of Bank Supervision (Oct. 17, 2019) (forthcoming) 
(describing the development of the bank supervision in the United States and highlighting its monetary
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regime needed? And so forth. I won’t delve into these questions here other than 




Bernanke’s blockbuster paper points to fertile ground for law and 
macroeconomics. Legal scholars who focus on financial stability regulation need
to pay careful attention to the economic research on the channels through which
financial crises transmit macroeconomic devastation. By the same token, 
macroeconomists can learn from legal scholars on questions of legal-institutional 
engineering. One interpretation of economic history—one that is corroborated 
to some degree by Bernanke’s paper—is that private money often plays a central 
role in macroeconomic disasters, at least those emanating from the financial 
sector. The law of money encompasses the law of central banking, including such 
topics as administrative structure and independence110 as well as emergency 
powers. This Article has argued that the law of money must also address the 
interface between public monetary institutions and private law.111 It seems to me




110. For an illuminating treatment, see PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2016). 
111. The roles of “public” and “private” in English monetary history, and in theories of money more
generally, receive profound treatment in CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND
THE COMING OF CAPITALISM (2014). 
